Bush's Asia policy lacks drive
Weston S. Konishi / Special to The Daily Yomiuri
In the future, U.S. President George W. Bush is likely to look
back at 2005 as his annus horribilis--a horrible year, when the
Bush presidency was hit by the forces of politics and nature.
Amid the overwhelming problems in Iraq and the aftermath of hurricane
Katrina, it may be understandable that Bush's attention is distracted
from other policy areas--but that does not make the implications
any less troubling. Bush's Asia policy needs more consistent attention,
yet there are signs that U.S. policy in the region lacks the drive
and focus it had earlier in the administration. If this continues,
2005 may someday be seen as a watershed year not just for the president
but for broader U.S. engagement in the region as well.
Bush's visit to Japan, China, Mongolia and South Korea in November
is the most recent sign of the drift from the region. The White
House had low expectations for the visit and by most accounts those
expectations were met.
There was an odd sense of incongruity throughout the trip. Beginning
in Japan, Bush gave a speech on democracy aimed largely at China.
While in South Korea, mainly to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation forum, Bush dubiously claimed that U.S.-South Korean
ties have "never been better." In China, the summit with
President Hu Jintao was notably low-key for a meeting of such potential
magnitude. As expected, nothing of great consequence emerged from
the Mongolia trip.
The lackluster visit to the region is all the more disappointing
given the fact much more could have been accomplished. Bush might
have used his meeting with Junichiro Koizumi to quietly convince
the prime minister to end his Yasukuni Shrine visits, as they have
done enough damage to regional interests. The president's visit
to Seoul did produce one intriguing proposal: a pledge for a ministerial-level
strategic dialogue between the two allies. Yet this initiative
remains undefined, and it is not clear how it will improve on the
range of official channels both nations already enjoy. In Beijing,
Bush also passed up the opportunity to reinforce U.S. Deputy Secretary
of State Robert Zoellick's recent call for China to become a "responsible
stakeholder" in the global community. In the absence of any
tangible headway across these fronts it is hard to see what was
accomplished in the Asia trip at all.
To be fair, summitry is not always the best measure of diplomatic
achievement. Substance seldom accompanies state visits. However,
what is striking about Bush's meetings in Asia throughout the years
is how little he has to show for them. Having come into office
with a particularly strong Asia team, expectations were high that
Bush would throw his weight behind a range of regional initiatives,
from APEC to the alliance with Japan. While Bush's rapport with
Koizumi is positive on a personal level, his record of concrete
diplomatic accomplishments in Asia is less stellar. Former President
Bill Clinton's April 1996 summit with then Prime Minister Ryutaro
Hashimoto, by comparison, stands out as the trigger for a range
of alliance improvements such as the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing
Agreement and the review of the Japan-U.S. defense guidelines.
Beyond Bush's personal involvement in regional diplomacy, there
are signs that Washington has allowed ongoing diplomatic initiatives
to founder as well. The administration's interest in the six-party
talks over North Korea's nuclear ambitions seems to have waned
since a set of principles was reached in September. The United
States is not the only party responsible for letting the process
stall. Pyongyang has done all it can to hamper next steps in the
September agreement. However, there is a general consensus among
experts in Washington that, absent of presidential backing, lead
U.S. negotiator Chris Hill's effort to sustain momentum in the
process has been curtailed by hard-line elements in the administration.
Indeed, there are no outward signs that Washington is gearing up
for the next round of talks or giving top-level attention to the
issue.
One area of Asia policy where the administration has shown persistence
is in the bilateral alliance with Japan. After months of painstaking
negotiations earlier this year, both allies came to an interim
agreement in late October on proposals to transform the alliance
and realign U.S. bases across Japan. Pentagon officials were clearly
relieved to have completed the negotiations and turn the process
back to their Japanese counterparts, who must now convince relevant
local communities to accept the base realignment plans. Still,
the implementation of the transformation and realignment plans
will require sustained bilateral coordination over the coming months
and years, and the United States cannot afford to let that process
recede into the background of broader strategic defense initiatives.
Keeping Asia a priority of U.S. foreign policy is a challenge
for any administration, but as members of Bush's Asia team rotate
out of the government, this endeavor may grow increasingly difficult.
U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, perhaps the most
senior Asia hand in the first Bush term, left the government earlier
this year. His successor, Zoellick, is focused on China (as suggested
by his "responsible stakeholder" statement), but is considered
less engaged with regional allies like Japan and South Korea. The
recent departure of senior Asia director Michael Green from the
National Security Council will also deprive the administration
of another respected Asia hand in a key policy position.
The White House is now in full campaign mode to recover from this
year's political damage. It should take a page from former U.S.
President Ronald Reagan's second term by reinvigorating its foreign
policy agenda in general and focusing more attention on Northeast
Asia in particular. Indeed, the problems affecting the region right
now, from historical disputes to the impasse over North Korea,
cry out for more active and sustained U.S. leadership. A more ambitious
Asia policy, with all the risks and rewards that that entails,
could be one way to leave this annus horribilis behind.
Weston Konishi is program director at the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation.
The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation
1401 New York Ave. NW Suite 740
Washington, DC 20005
Telephone: (202) 347-1994
Fax: (202) 347-3941 matwater@mansfieldfdn.org
