Even as scores of protesters angrily awaited George W. Bush’s
arrival in India on March 1, 2006,
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh breached protocol to meet his guest
at the airport—giving many reason to believe that Indo-U.S.
relations would very soon undergo a dramatic makeover.
Eleventh hour wrangling over the separation of India’s firmly
entwined military and civilian nuclear programs has resulted in
a momentous U.S.-India civil nuclear deal, strongly endorsed by
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the “cornerstone
of global non-proliferation efforts.” The pact ensures “full
civil nuclear energy cooperation between India and the United States
and between India and the international community as a whole.” Under
the provisions of the agreement, India will permanently reclassify
14 of its 22 nuclear power reactors as civilian facilities and
will make them available to international inspections. The remaining
eight reactors, however, will not be subject to inspections and
will continue as military installations. After much haggling, India
has also managed to retain the right to develop future fast-breeder
reactors for
military use—astonishing critics of the deal, who described
the country’s willingness to subject only some of its nuclear
programs to inspections as “meaningless.” Meanwhile,
most proponents of the pact view it as the panacea for India’s
burgeoning energy needs, with France describing it as a crucial
step toward curbing climate change.
While the accord is no silver bullet for India’s energy
requirements, symbolically, it certainly provides a shot in the
arm to the country’s reputation as an emerging international
power—terminating its five decades of nuclear isolation and
acknowledging its growing strategic partnership with the United
States. That being said, India is not the only one that stands
to benefit from the deal. Cozying up to India is critical to the
Bush administration’s strategic interests since the country
is home to the second largest Muslim population in the world and
sits squarely between the Middle East and China, making it a prime
U.S. ally in the region. Needless to say, as a rapidly growing
emerging market, it is also a major destination for American businesses.
Undoubtedly the proverbial “China Factor” also plays
a vital role as the United States seeks to foment ties with India;
but the pundits are unconcerned about enraging China. They believe
that the recent surge in Sino-Indian economic relations is more
than sufficient to eclipse any deal that India might strike with
the United States.
Yet, hysteria over creating an exception for India, a non-signatory
to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and rewarding [India]
for “bad behavior” abounds. Critics fear that the accord,
which is yet to be ratified by the U.S. Congress, offers too many
concessions to India and could jeopardize non-proliferation efforts.
They fret that India will launch into a frenzied expansion of its
nuclear arsenal and use its domestic uranium supply to mass produce
weapons, thereby jeopardizing the non-proliferation regime.
Such panic is surely unwarranted. Unlike other non-signatories
to the NPT, India is a stable democracy with a proven track record
of being a legitimate, responsible nuclear power, having never
indulged in proliferation. More importantly, India is also unique
in that its military is so fiscally and politically dependent on
and accountable to civilian oversight that civilian power prevails
in all matters of national security, from policymaking to planning
and implementation. The country is also mending fences with Pakistan
and has been involved in a formal peace process for the better
part of two years. Furthermore, India’s relationship with
China is seeing good days as New Delhi and Beijing focus on fostering
a flourishing economic partnership.
A robust U.S.-India relationship has certainly been a long time
coming; and while the nuclear deal may be the centerpiece of the
brand new strategic partnership, a series of fresh initiatives
in other sectors ranging from jointly combating terrorism to supporting
trade and investment and cooperating on space exploration demonstrate
the breadth of the latest collaboration. There is hardly a chance
that the U.S.-India nuclear pact, if approved by Congress, will
end up putting more weapons in the hands of terrorists; but there
is definitely a glimmer of hope that other nuclear-armed nations
might follow India’s example and clean house in anticipation
of landing a similar deal.
Niharika Chibber Joe is the Associate Director of the Mansfield
Fellowship Program at the Maureen and Mansfield Foundation. She
also directs the Foundation’s India programs. The views expressed
in this commentary are those of the author and not necessarily
the views of the Mansfield Foundation.
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