 |
|
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
|
|
|
|
|
Commentary
From the Far East to the Old West: Chinese and Japanese Settlers in Montana
|
FIFTY YEARS OF SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS: THE IDEA OF “CHINDIA”
In spite of New Delhi and Beijing’s divergent perceptions and approaches toward their 125,000 sq km disputed territory, the Sino-Pakistani strategic partnership, and Tibet, the on-again-off-again Sino-Indian relationship has undergone a remarkable transformation in the past fifty-some years, planting India and China squarely on the map as the two natural partners in Asia. While South Asia scholars look narrowly at the region as primarily India and Pakistan, and East Asia watchers avoid the landmass south west of Tibet, relationships in Asia are rapidly changing as China “rises” and India “emerges”. As the two countries continue to grow in regional significance, and as security partnerships in Asia enter a unique era of realignment, it is essential to ponder what drives the dynamic between these two emerging Asian powers.
In 2004, China and India marked the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Panchsheel Treaty amidst much fanfare—2006 is their Year of Friendship and they will undertake various economic, trade, defense, technology and tourism initiatives to mark the occasion. How are they interacting with and adjusting to each other in the 21st century? Under what circumstances did Panchsheel come about? And where are we fifty years later? Are India and China heading toward conflict or cooperation? As the two grow in size and strategic and economic significance, it is crucial that they be aware that in this age of globalization their interaction with each other has the potential to deeply impact stability and prosperity in Asia—and the world at large.
Although they share a common border, India and China view the South Asian region differently. For India, South Asia extends from the Persian Gulf in the west to across the Malacca Strait in the east; and from the Central Asian Republics in the north, to the equator in the south. China, on the other hand, has confined its definition of South Asia to the SAARC countries of India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and the Maldives. Recently, a story in the U.K-based Guardian newspaper referred to India and China as “non-identical conjoined twins, joined at the Himalayas.” Even so, the two countries have more in common than meets the eye. With their mounting economic and geopolitical status, both wish to be accepted as predominant powers in the region. They also seek to promote a multipolar world wherein they can wield diplomatic clout. That notwithstanding, they are also looking to establish a more cooperative relationship with the United States, as demonstrated by New Delhi and Washington’s recent civilian nuclear deal. At number two and number six in the world, respectively, China and India are also both giant energy consumers and importers—competing for world oil and gas. Additionally, both countries are striving for domestic economic growth.
As recently as a hundred years ago Indian and Chinese leaders were too preoccupied with their own struggles to have much contact with each other. China and India were the proverbial ships passing in the night. Indian leaders were convinced that due to its size and geostrategic position, it was only a matter of time before India became a major player in world affairs. Jawaharlal Nehru strongly believed that India had the upper hand in developing as the center of political and economic activity in not only the Indian Ocean, but also in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. However, by the time India shed British rule in 1947 and the communist party unified China in 1949, the two countries had developed, what Francine Frankel describes as, “mirror-opposite national narratives of their rightful place in Asia.” A 1990’s disclosure of classified studies revealed that Chinese leadership was certain that India, under Nehru’s watch, was harboring the ambition of establishing the so-called greater Indian empire.
Nehru’s grandiose visions were shattered in 1947 with the partition of India. The carving of the country into India and Pakistan seriously impacted India’s military strength as well as its strategic position. India lost 17.5 percent of its territory and Pakistan now occupied what had been India’s borders in southern Afghanistan and Southeast Asia. Pakistan also began occupying the United States’ interest as a tactical ally in the Cold War. Consequently, it was critical that Prime Minister Nehru’s non-aligned India cultivated a strong Sino-Indian relationship that would undermine the superpowers in the region. Nehru’s actions, some scholars argue, were motivated by the conviction that India would win China’s cooperation and confidence to construct an Asian balance that would counter the influence of the superpowers. Nehru was a shrewd geostrategist who counted on the historic destiny of India and China to eventually come together as one unified force. He placed great expectations on the two countries—if India and China were to work together, he was sure they would rise to a central place on the global stage, exerting a powerful influence on the rest of the world.
Between 1949 and 1957 India and China shared a brief honeymoon. They established diplomatic ties and sent high-level delegations to each other’s country. India made concessions on Tibet, advocated China’s entry into the United Nations, and was sympathetic toward China in post-Korean War negotiations. The early 50’s saw a growing solidarity between the two nations. “Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai” (Indians and Chinese are brothers) became a popular slogan of the time, and on April 29, 1954 Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Premier Zhou En-Lai signed the historic Agreement of Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet region of China, and India. The agreement included the termination of extra territorial privileges that the British had enjoyed in Tibet. More importantly, it listed Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, or the “Panchsheel” The Panchsheel advocated mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; mutual non-interference in international affairs; equality and mutual benefit; peaceful coexistence.
By the late 1950’s however, Sino-India relations had taken a turn for the worse as negotiations over the disputed border began to fail. This, coupled with the flight of Tibetan refugees into India further exacerbated tensions between the two countries. In 1962, Nehru’s aspiration that the two ancient civilizations would forge a formidable friendship in the postcolonial world was crushed. India and China were embroiled in a bloody war, followed by acutely strained relations from 1962 to 1976. As the Sino-Indian relationship underwent a Cold War of its own, it was time for Hindi-Chini-Bye Bye.
With President Jiang Zemin’s visit to India in 1996 and the resulting military confidence building measures, sunshine had touched the Sino-Indian relationship once again. However, it was not long before there was a new setback when India tested nuclear weapons in 1998, citing China as the potential threat factor. Subsequently, in an effort to rekindle its relationship with China, India promptly dispatched foreign minister Jaswant Singh to Beijing—a significant diplomatic move aimed at quelling acrimony between the two countries. Singh publicly retracted the China threat rhetoric and explicitly told Chinese leadership that India perceived no threat whatsoever from China.
When Premier Zhu Rongji visited India in 2002, he declared that as the two largest countries in Asia, India and China bore the responsibility of bringing stability and security to the Asia-Pacific region.
The postwar era has witnessed great economic miracles in Japan and South Korea. But rarely has the growth of two relatively poor countries inspired such worldwide fascination. Nehru’s dream may be coming to pass as India and China enjoy a period of stability and growing economic ties. For more than two decades since the war in 1962, India’s policy toward China centered primarily on the border dispute. Today, the ships passing in the night are flashing a light at each other and learning to do business.
Even as recently as 2002, when Zhu Rongji visited India, three out of four people on the street said that they knew nothing about the visit and had no opinion about Sino-Indian relations; and the fourth vaguely recalled that the two countries had fought a war in the 60’s. The trade Gods are certainly smiling now and Diwali is brighter as “Made in China” Hindu deities and hundreds of little lights from Fujin province crowd markets in not only Indian metropolises, but also the far reaches of the country. The rapid increase in bilateral trade is indeed one of the most encouraging recent developments in Sino-Indian relations. Now, companies in the world’s two largest emerging economies are seriously exploring business prospects in each other’s markets. China now produces more computer science graduates than India; and India is anxious to tap into the Chinese domestic market, which is growing at an annual rate of 20%. With the Hindi-Chini Buy-Buy phenomenon coming into effect, media reports indicate that China is planning to explore reopening the historic 478-mile Stilwell Road to connect India’s northeast with Yunan province. Another significant development is that the first direct trade link between India and China will be re-opened in Sikkim. Nathu La pass at 15,000 feet—the world’s highest custom post, will resume business.
At the recent World Economic Forum meetings in Davos, China and India flaunted their booming economies to the world’s business and political leaders. The “Chindia” effect has finally come into play. The Guardian newspaper reports that the “Chindia” region’s huge domestic markets comprising one third of all humanity, cheap highly skilled labor, and governments pursuing capital-friendly policies have led many to conclude that the world is at a tipping point in history.
The past fifty odd years have been fraught with what John Garver aptly labels “protracted geopolitical conflict” in Sino-Indian relations. China and India share a multidimensional and complex relationship of cooperation and conflict . Even though the two countries are resuming border talks, there is no doubt the border dispute resolution process will be a long drawn out one. And for the foreseeable future India and China will surely remain competitive neighbors with starkly different political systems, unresolved territorial issues, a history of border wars, and a very keen eye on the balance of power in Asia.
My cautiously optimistic view dictates that in the coming decades, the Sino-Indian relationship is slated to be one of the most important bilateral relationships in the world. Michael Vatikiotis writes, “India and China are performing an awkward tango. Each is wary of the other as partners; both are talented and experienced on their feet. But dance together they must.” And while China may be the so-called motivating factor behind the United States’ new strategic partnership with India, China and India are traditional competitors who realize that they can work together in a cooperative environment.
This steadily maturing bond of coopetition is unmistakably marked by Beijing and New Delhi’s mutual interests in integrating their economies into the global trading system, supporting global disarmament and de-weaponization, and promoting the peaceful civilian use of outer space. With 40% of the world’s population and a gigantic share of it’s material and human resources, as developing countries, the two countries are also faced by the common challenge of eradicating poverty, and improving the standard of living of their people. These converging priorities may be incentive enough for both countries to avoid conflict in other areas where distrust and suspicions continue to linger.
And as China rises and India emerges, I recall reading somewhere,
an interview with an unnamed Indian security official, “There
will always be a sense of rivalry between China and India. It hasn’t
gone away regardless of how many centuries we go back. But in ten
to fifteen years this rivalry will not degenerate into anything.
We don’t want it, and they don’t want it.”
Please forward media inquiries to:Director of Communications The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation 
About the Foundation | Asian Opinion Polls |
Mansfield Fellowships
|