The Sept. 11 Japanese Elections: A Post-Election Analysis
By Weston S. Konishi and Teruo Iwai
September 12, 2005
Summary
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi won an overwhelming victory in Sunday’s
House of Representatives (Lower House) elections. Koizumi’s Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP) gained 47 seats for a total of 296 seats in the Lower House, while
the main opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) fell from 175 to 113 seats.
The LDP, along with ruling coalition partner New Komeito (31 seats), now has
a two-thirds majority in the Lower House, or enough votes to pass a bill through
both houses of the Diet.
The Sept. 11 elections focused almost entirely on Koizumi’s
plan to privatize the Japanese postal system, which has financial
assets of approximately 3 trillion dollars. The privatization bill
passed the Lower House in July, but would not have passed the Upper
House in a subsequent vote. Koizumi therefore dissolved the Lower
House and called for snap elections. This essentially made the
Sept. 11 elections a referendum on postal privatization.
What was at stake?
Koizumi hoped to accomplish at least two objectives by dissolving
the Diet and calling for snap elections: flush out old guard LDP
critics of the postal reform; and gain enough public support to
pass the bill through the Upper House. Koizumi pledged to resign
if he failed to win the election.
From the DPJ’s point of view, the elections presented an
opportunity to build on its recent political momentum. The DPJ
gained seats in the 2004 Upper House elections and the party was
operating under the assumption that it had nowhere to go but up
(in fact, until this election, the DPJ had never failed to add
seats in the Diet). The DPJ’s “manifesto” included
calls for fine-tuning the postal reform proposal, withdrawing Japanese
troops from Iraq and removing U.S. bases from Okinawa. Like Koizumi,
DPJ president Katsuya Okada offered to resign if his party failed
to gain a majority on Sept. 11.
Political implications
Koizumi now has a broad mandate to lead Japan until his term expires
in Sept. 2006 (there is speculation that Koizumi may try to extend
his tenure but he insists he will step down in accordance with
LDP rules). Among the 37 “rebels” within the LDP who
resisted postal reform, only 17 survived the election. Former Prime
Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto also retired from the Diet, effectively
spelling the end of his faction and the practice of factionalism
in Japanese politics.
As promised, Okada resigned the DPJ leadership and his successor
is yet to be determined. The fate of the party itself is in question.
Koizumi challenged Okada head on and voters responded with a resounding
rejection of the DPJ and its manifesto for Japan. The country seems
even farther away from obtaining a two-party system, as the DPJ
for the time being is no longer a viable alternative to the LDP.
Policy implications
It is a foregone conclusion that the postal reform legislation will pass the
Upper House (which is now an almost irrelevant chamber). The reforms may
pave the way for greater deregulation and privatization across a broad range
of industries in Japan.
Given Koizumi’s fixation on postal reform during the campaign,
it is unclear at this point what other policies he will prioritize
in his remaining year in office. Popular issues include social
security reform to prepare for Japan’ rapidly aging society
and education reform.
Many foreign policy initiatives were in a holding pattern pending
the elections. In particular, bilateral negotiations over U.S.
force realignments in Japan seemed to be taking a back seat to
postal privatization. Now that he has the political capital, Koizumi
has the ability to focus attention on the realignment initiative
and help persuade local authorities to accept bilateral proposals.
On the campaign trail Koizumi suggested that he would improve
ties with China and Korea. It is unclear how the prime minister
will do so, especially since he is likely to visit Yasukuni Shrine
in December. The shrine honors Japanese Class-A war criminals and
is the source of diplomatic tension between Japan and the mainland.
Japan and China are also posturing over disputed natural gas fields
in the East China Sea.
The bottom line
Koizumi has fundamentally altered the political landscape in Tokyo by marginalizing
the old guard in his party as well as the main opposition force. The most
immediate short-term impact will be the privatization of the postal system.
However, we are unlikely to see a Koizumi administration that is noticeably
different from what it has been for the past four years. The prime minister
will continue to be a strong supporter of the U.S. alliance but he is unlikely
to use his remaining time in office to achieve something in the magnitude
of revising the Constitution or increasing defense spending.
The long-term impact of these elections (what may be considered
Koizumi’s legacy) is likely to be subtle but profound. Koizumi
has done the unthinkable in the context of Japanese politics—in
his own words he has “destroyed the old LDP.” Not only
are the LDP and its traditional powerbase reconfigured, but the
opposition is arguably weaker (both politically and ideologically)
than anytime in postwar history. What is left of the LDP is now
a party of younger, reform-minded, and occasionally hawkish politicians.
How effective they are at running the country remains to be seen,
particularly after Koizumi leaves office. If the opposition wants
to reestablish its strength it will have to prove to Japanese voters
that its policies offer a more progressive and compelling alternative.
Weston Konishi is program director and Teruo Iwai is program assistant
at the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation. The views expressed
in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the Mansfield Foundation.
The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation
1401 New York Ave. NW Suite 740
Washington, DC 20005
Telephone: (202) 347-1994
Fax: (202) 347-3941 matwater@mansfieldfdn.org
