Sunshine or Moonshine?:
Inter-Korean relations and their impact upon the U.S.-DPRK conundrum
L. Gordon Flake
Executive Director
The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation
Draft prepared for presentation at the
Asia Foundation/ KINU Conference on “ Implementing the Six-Party Joint Statement and
the Korean Peninsula"
Washington D.C.
November 10, 2005
Over the past several years the North Korean nuclear program has
re-emerged as the highest profile issue in American views of the
Korean peninsula. As such it has overshadowed and even cast a pall
upon other political, diplomatic and even economic issues between
the United States and South Korea. Given the primacy of this issue,
inter-Korean relations, or more specifically, the South Korean
policy towards North Korea has been largely viewed by the United
States from the perspective of its impact upon efforts to solve
the nuclear crisis.
South Korean policy towards North Korea is of course multifaceted
and designed to accomplish multiple objectives including the maintenance
of stability, the avoidance of war, the provision of humanitarian
aid, the facilitation of family reunions, and others. For the United
States, however, the nuclear issue clearly takes precedence over
all other objectives. As such, this analysis is not intended to
be a broad assessment of South Korean policy toward North Korea,
but rather of South Korean policy and inter-Korean relations as
they impact upon the core issues in the U.S.-North Korean relationship.
Viewed from this relatively narrow perspective, the U.S. assessment
of South Korea’s approach to the North has been generally
negative. South Korea is seen to be “soft” on North
Korea or worse, to be actively advocating on North Korea’s
behalf. It is not uncommon for South Korean policy toward the North
to be characterized as “appeasement ” ands its role
to be that of a “lawyer.” South Korean reticence to
publicly criticize the North, or even to forcefully advocate in
public for formal ROK positions that might cause discomfort to
the North is viewed by some as a tendency to be “more Catholic
than the Pope.” Commonly sited examples of this behavior
include ROK abstentions at the UN on votes on Human Rights and
silence from Seoul on the morning of September 20, 2005 when four
other parties at the most recent round of six party talks quickly
and publicly responded to the North Korean demands for the immediate
provision of LWRs in contravention to the agreement spelled out
in the September 19 Joint Statement.
Such views need not be exaggerated. Tactical cooperation between
the Blue House and the White House and between the Foreign Ministry
and the State Department continues. There remains general agreement
on policy objectives and U.S. officials continue publicly praise
U.S.-ROK cooperation. The political relationship, however, is a
different story. In private, the assessment of the ROK role in
dealing with North Korea is much harsher, even from Administration
officials. A leaked comment from one Senior U.S. official after
the last round of talks that the ROK statements (particularly those
made in Seoul by senior ROK officials) were “not helpful” gained
considerable attention. Worse still are sentiments on Capitol Hill
and among the analysis community where South Korean pressure on
the U.S. to include the wording on LWRs in the September 19 Joint
Statement was seen by some as a betrayal.
Assessing U.S. Intentions: The Fulcrum of Perceptions on Inter-Korean
Relations
Ultimately, the efficacy of ROK policy toward North Korea, especially
when confined to the narrow issue of its impact on the nuclear
issue, cannot be viewed in a vacuum. One’s perception of
ROK policy largely depends on one’s view of U.S. policy toward
DPRK and the intentions behind U.S. policy. For example, if one
views the current Bush Administration as being committed to regime
change in North Korea and unwilling to accept anything less, then
ROK efforts to thwart that policy should be seen in a different
light. Likewise, in the negotiating process itself, if one views
the U.S. as similarly or even equally intransigent as the DPRK,
then the efforts of the R.O.K. to play a mediating role do not
so readily smack of disloyalty. Conversely, if, despite the public
rhetoric, the U.S. policy toward the DPRK is seem as open to a
genuine breakthrough and we take President Bush at his word regarding
his commitment to solve the current crisis through diplomacy, then
such conclusions open up a valid arena for assessing whether or
not South Korea policy is actually helpful in reaching a negotiated
settlement. Ultimately, ROK policy toward DPRK cannot be understood,
without understanding the U.S.-DPRK dynamic to which the ROK is,
wrongly or rightly, reacting.
Accordingly, this short assessment looks at alternate views of
U.S. policy and intent toward North Korea and attempts to evaluate
inter-Korean relations from each perspective.
Sunshine: Engagement and Advocacy to an end
Over time Kim Dae Jung’s “sunshine policy” has
become a bit of a caricature and so tainted with known excesses
that even ROK politicians seldom use the term. However it is
useful to remember that the inspiration for the sunshine policy
was not simply a benignly smiling “happy face” but
rather the highly normative contest between the wind and the
sun in Aesop’s fable in the effort to convince a traveler
to remove his cloak. Interestingly, even at this conceptual level,
the sun was not acting alone, but in contrast to the wind, rain
and sleet of its competitor. When Kim Dae Jung began espousing
this policy construct, the role of the wind was not played by
the U.S. which had already adopted a relatively benign approach
toward the North, but by his predecessor Kim Young Sam. Today,
however, it is fair to say that the average Korean would likely
perceive the U.S. as pursuing the harsh, potentially dangerous,
and ultimately unsuccessful approach of trying to pressure North
Korea into change.
The U.S. approach to North Korea has been particularly harsh on
rhetorical level and this rhetoric has impacted Seoul perhaps even
more than it has impacted North Korea. President Bush’s declared
distrust of North Korea, his expressed of “loathing” of
Kim Jong Il, the inclusion of North Korea in an “axis of
evil” and its categorization of an “outpost of tyranny” have
all fueled fears in Seoul, as well as presumably Pyongyang, about
U.S. intentions toward North Korea. The Iraq war heightened such
concerns and many in Korea began to view North Korea as being next
on the list in the implementation of the U.S. doctrine of preemption.
The open divisions in the U.S. regarding policy toward the North
further fueled worries about the influence of the neocons and their
intentions. Key statements about “not negotiating with evil ”,
resisting North Korea “blackmail” and not “rewarding
bad behavior” have further undercut trust for the U.S. negotiating
approach.
In short, ROK policy toward North Korea must be understood as
a reaction to views that some in the U.S. will only accept regime
change, that the U.S. approach is a major part of problem, that
the U.S. has been inflexible in negotiations, and that U.S. hardliners
have deliberately undermined diplomacy.
It is in contrast to these presumptions that the ROK attempt to
hold on to its policy of engagement is best understood. From a
U.S. perspective the economic engagement of North Korea was built
upon a security foundation. In short, no 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework,
no sunshine policy. When the agreed framework and thus the security
foundation for the engagement policy fell apart in an accelerated
manner in 2002-2003 many in the U.S. fully expected the ROK engagement
of the North Korea stop as well.
Instead, the ROK has sought to insulate inter-Korean relations
from the ill effects of the resurgent nuclear crisis. American
readers will be familiar with the Warner Brother’s cartoon
character Wile E. Coyote who habitually ran off high cliffs and
remained suspended in mid-air only so long as he didn’t recognize
the void below. Similarly, ROK proponents of engagement with the
North refuse to look down. A limited review of South Korean motivations
for this gravity defying behavior is helpful.
Changing the nature of the North Korean Regime
Although there are some concerning signs that at least the short
term objectives of South Korean engagement of the North are
to stabilize the regime, the long term goal of gradually and
peacefully
affecting change in the nature of the North Korean regime remains.
When pressed, analysts on both sides of the debate will concede
that genuine verification and a satisfactory resolution of
the nuclear issue is almost impossible to even conceptualize
without
a change in the fundamental nature of the regime in North Korea.
Thus the debate turns to the most effective means or promoting
such change and the South Korean position apparently continues
to be that inducements are more effective that pressure. Though
such conclusions are hotly debated, supporters of the current
direction of inter-Korean relations regularly point to the
Mount Kumkang project, the Kaesong industrial zone, the number
of South
Korean tourists visiting the North and the relatively regular
inter-Korean dialogues (all almost unimaginable just a decade
ago) as evidence of the success of their approach.
Strengthening North Korea’s Ability to Compromise
Another related justification for the South Korean approach to
inter-Korean relations is the belief that weakness effectively
inhibits the ability of North Korea to make hard decisions. They
point to recent North Korean concessions including their return
to the six-party talks as well as improvements in inter-Korean
relations as evidence of the efficacy of Seoul’s approach
to date. Accordingly, South Korea seems to take at face value
North Korea’s calls for security and economic assurances
and seems to see the six party talks as an appropriate format
for addressing North Korea insecurities.
Resisting and re-directing U.S. Hard line
Perhaps the clearest justification for an advocacy role by South
Korea on behalf of North Korea is that perception that the
U.S. has taken upon itself the role of prosecutor, judge and
jury.
Based on hard-line threats both real and imagined, ROK officials
have sought to moderate what they perceive to be the harshest
of U.S. inclinations. At the same time they seek to influence
how North Korean actions and statements are perceived in Washington
so as to avoid the further deterioration of U.S. views of North
Korea. There is also a tendency to hold the line on relatively
progressive South Korean positions out of a concern that opening
the door to coercive measures would only encourage the U.S.
to pursue such measures more actively, resulting in negative
North
Korean reactions and initiating a vicious cycle.
These policy views have placed many South Korean officials in
an awkward position. Some of the same Korean officials who in the
early 1990s warned Americans that, due to linguistic and cultural
barriers, they did not understand Koreans the way the South did
and that Pyongyang could not be trusted, now again claim intimate
knowledge of the North’s views but instead urge the U.S.
to take North Korean statements, at least the positive ones, at
face value. This cheerleader effect continues to impact U.S. perceptions
of the ROK, but should be correctly viewed as part of an attempt
to nudge a reluctant ally into a more progressive approach towards
the North. The underlying vision for this approach, particularly
in the six party talks context, is to gradually bind North Korea
into series of tactical choices that will open up further avenues
for exchange and confidence building that will ultimately change
the nature of the North Korea regime.
Moonshine: of Misperceptions and Miscalculations
One does not necessary need to have a benign view of U.S. policy
toward North Korea to be critical of the ROK approach to inter-Korean
relations. Interestingly, opponents of an overly soft inducement-centric
approach to dealing with North Korea reserve their greatest skepticism
for the capacity of the North Korean regime to change and the perceived
naiveté of the South Korean approach. Underpinning many
such views is the presumption that inducements alone are not sufficient
to convince North Korea to make a difficult strategic-level decision
to abandon its nuclear ambitions and that the South Korean approach
to inter-Korean relations not only undermines the likelihood of
North feeling the necessity of making such a strategic decision,
but also increases the likelihood of a North Korean miscalculation.
Misperceptions of the Threat
Americans have been shocked by polls coming from Seoul suggesting
that Koreans see the United States as a greater threat to Korea’s
national security than North Korea. The reaction in Washington
to such polls has ranged from feelings of bewilderment to a sense
of betrayal. Few of the reports on such South Korean views are
nuanced enough to explain that what Koreans fear is not any action
against South Korea, but an aggressive U.S. approach that might
provoke an unwanted and unthinkable conflict with North Korea.
At first glance, such South Korean concern is understandable.
Given President Bush’s repeated personal criticism of Kim
Jong Il, North Korea’s inclusion in an “Axis of Evil” that
is now trimmed to two nations, North Korea’s continued inclusion
on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terror during a global war
on terror, and the promulgation of the U.S. doctrine of preemptive
action, Koreans might justifiably be paranoid. However understandable,
such views exaggerate the risk from Washington, and as a close
ally South Korea might also be expected to have deeper understanding
of U.S. interests.
The presumption that the United States would callously provoke
a war with North Korea without consideration for the Korean people
or for American lives and interests in Korea is almost offensive.
Such a presumption does not take into account the shared interests
the United States has in avoiding a conflict in Korea. Korea is
no longer the country it was in early 1950. It is the world’s
twelfth largest economy and the United States’ seventh largest
trade partner. With tens of thousands of Americans living in Korea
and with American firms having invested billions of dollars in
the Korean economy, to say nothing of the impact on the broader
regional economy of Northeast Asia, the United States has every
reason to seek a peaceful solution in Korea.
Of deeper concern than public opinion polls are statements from
and policies of the Korean government that suggest that the Roh
administration perceives the need to blunt or block U.S. pressure
on the North. The underlying implication is that South Korea has
more to fear from U.S. policy than from the misdeeds of the North.
Indeed, blame for North Korea’s behavior is commonly placed
at the feet of the Americans. In recent months, any suggestion
of possible punitive actions from Washington are met, or even pre-empted,
by statements from the top in Seoul declaring such pressure unacceptable.
One consequence of the concern about the risks of U.S. aggression
against the North is that South Korea apparently feels obligated
to act as an advocate or a lawyer for North Korea in order to reduce
the perceived risk of U.S. action. Statements from Pyongyang are
regularly “interpreted” in the most benign possible
light by Seoul, doubt is cast upon U.S. intelligence, and South
Korean delegations to Washington and even President Roh himself
urge understanding of North Korea’s situation and perspective.
Similarly, South Korean calls for “both” Washington
and Pyongyang to exhibit flexibility are seen by some in the United
States as moral relativism that calls the very nature of our alliance
into question.
Avoiding War at Any cost
Yet another possible policy consequence of the South Korean misreading
of the risks of U.S. aggression against the North is an apparent
unwillingness on South Korea’s part to even discuss the
possibility of coercive measures, presumably out of a fear that
to do so would open the door to U.S. hardliners. South Koreans
rightly point out that the Roh administration has not expanded
the inter-Korean economic relationship, and even withheld some
assistance to the North. Yet, to an American perspective, merely
withholding a carrot hardly seems a response commensurate with
the seriousness of North Korean moves. The underlying policy
difference is that the United States remains convinced that the
current crisis cannot be solved by inducements alone, but only
by the simultaneous multilateral application of both pressure
and inducements, whereas to date, South Korea has eschewed any
consideration of pressure as too risky.
From South Korean Misallocation to North Korean miscalculation
There continue to be a number of observers in both Korea and the
United States who persist in viewing North Korea as somehow smarter-by-half
than the rest of the world. They see Kim Jong Il as a crafty
negotiator who has played a bad hand very well and in so doing
stymied the world’s sole remaining superpower. More specifically,
they see North Korean provocations as carefully calibrated. A
cursory review of North Korean decisions over the past decade
can also produce a starkly different assessment. Why assume that
the output of a closed society with poor resources and poor information
flows will somehow produce superior results? Rather than carefully
tiptoeing around redlines, North Korea has rushed past nearly
every red line set out in the past decade save one, the export
of nuclear weapons materials, and has even flirted with that.
Likewise, North Korea’s handling of the kidnapping issue
with Japan, its partial economic reforms of July 2002, and even
its approach to South Korea all evidence some level of miscalculation.
Not only is North Korea an isolated regime hard-wired for paranoia,
but its decisions are often bound more by the particular sensitivities
regarding respect for the “dear leader” than by national
interest.
Given such a propensity for North Korea to miscalculate one might
fairly examine the relationship between ROK policy and North Korean
miscalculations. Do statements from the South Korean president
that suggest the North Korean pursuit of nuclear weapons is understandable
deter or encourage the North? What about rifts between Korea and
the United States, or more recently Korea and Japan? Do repeated
statements that “war is not an option” actually deter
war, or do they convince the North that there will be no consequences
for its actions? A strong case can be made that South Korea’s
advocacy on North Korea’s behalf, and in particular its repeated,
vocal insistence that coercive measures or force are not an option,
might actually increase the likelihood of further North Korean
provocations.
Conclusion
The two opposing views of U.S. intentions are not polar opposites
or even mutually exclusive. Likewise in a democratic South Korea
there exists a full spectrum of views on inter-Korean relations.
The fundamental challenge for the United States and South Korea
is to find sufficient common ground between these two extremes
that we can truly pursue a coordinated, if not a joint policy toward
North Korea.
To date Washington has primarily viewed inter-Korean relations
and the ROK engagement as something to be tolerated if not reigned
in. On the other hand, Seoul’s priority has been to separate
and insulate the inter-Korean track from the negative influences
of the nuclear crisis. It is only when inter-Korean relations are
an integral part of the strategy to address North Korea’s
nuclear issues in both Washington and Seoul that there will be
a real change of affecting the type of change necessary in North
Korea to solve the problem.
Just as it is difficult to imagine that coercion alone will convince
North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions, it is also increasingly
apparent that inducements alone will be sufficient to lead North
Korea to a strategic decision. Absent any consequences for a failure
to act, there is little cause for North Korea to depart from its
attempts to have its cake and eat it too.
One avenue for increased U.S.-ROK coordination on the nuclear
issue, and for the full inclusion of inter-Korean ties into the
strategy, is for the situation on the peninsula to deteriorate
rapidly. Some argue that the situation must get worse before it
can get better and that only a crisis, such as that which could
be provoked by an actual nuclear test, would be sufficient to convince
South Korea and China to seriously consider a full range of options.
Both South Korean and U.S. interests would be far better served
by a proactive, rather than a reactive, approach to a joint strategy
that sought to place both a full range of inducements and a full
range of coercive measures, both including key elements of inter-Korean
relations, on the table.
The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation
1401 New York Ave. NW Suite 740
Washington, DC 20005
Telephone: (202) 347-1994
Fax: (202) 347-3941 matwater@mansfieldfdn.org
