In the weeks immediately following North Korea’s July 5
launching of multiple missiles, Japan and the United States closely
collaborated at the United Nations and in the region to secure
a meaningful UN Security Council Resolution (1695) that not only
condemned the North Korea missile tests, but also called for sanctions
in response. Although there now appears to be some movement on
sanctions, some in Japan may have been disappointed by the Council’s
failure to accept the full Japanese proposal including what are
termed “Chapter 7 sanctions,” which would have held
the potential of some form of enforcement mechanism. However, given
the initial reticence by China and Russia, both with veto powers,
the final wording of the resolution greatly exceeded most expectations.
In essence, despite weeks of diplomatic wrangling in New York,
the Chinese negotiators were left to negotiate with themselves.
What appears to have been almost total intransigence by North Korea
in the face of Chinese diplomacy, which included a delegation to
Pyongyang, forced the Chinese step-by-step to a position approaching
that of the initial Japanese proposal. The final compromise resolution
is far closer to Japan’s initial draft that the bland expression
of displeasure initially tabled by China.
That Japan played such a key role following the missile tests
was in part due to Japan’s growing confidence on the world
scene and Japan’s current seat on the UN Security Council.
However, another important factor was the desire on the part of
the U.S. to play a low profile role in response to the launch.
While there was little if any daylight between the U.S. and Japanese
positions, in an effort to de-emphasize a bilateral response to
North Korea, the U.S. clearly encouraged Japanese leadership. This
was particularly true at the United Nations where it seemed that
at each press opportunity the U.S. ambassador to the UN was standing
immediately, if silently, behind the Japanese ambassador.
If there was a failure in the weeks following the test, it was
in the further collapse of the already nearly defunct trilateral
coordination between the United States and its two primary allies
in Northeast Asia: Korea and Japan. Certainly Japan’s seat
on the UN Security Council facilitated Japans leadership role.
However, while South Korea is not currently on the Council, this
absence alone cannot explain Seoul’s isolation. South Korea
claims to not have been consulted, either by the U.S. or by Japan.
On the other hand, Japanese officials have countered that their
willingness to consult with Korea was rebuffed, largely due to
ongoing bilateral Japan-Korea sensitivities surrounding territorial
issues such as Tokdo/ Takeshima and historical legacy issues such
as visits by Japanese political leaders to the Yasukuni Shrine.
U.S. officials have also complained that even at the top levels
Korean officials, while warning against a North Korean missile
test, were unwilling to coordinate a response in the eventuality
of an actual test.
In many respects, the international response to the July missile
launch provides a trial run for the potentially far more serious
risk that North Korea might test a nuclear device. While ultimately
unheeded, the unanimity and the comparatively blunt nature of the
warnings from the U.S., Japan, China, Russia, and South Korea to
North Korea not to test nevertheless marked a considerable diplomatic
achievement. However, it is sobering to remember that in spite
of, and on some level perhaps because of, such warnings, Pyongyang
opted to go forward with the tests. This failure of warnings to
have any effect is even more concerning in the light of the troubling
signs from North Korea in May 2005 of preparations for a nuclear
test and of reports in recent weeks regarding other indications
that bear close monitoring. Given the subterranean nature of a
potential North Korean nuclear test, it is likely that the U.S.,
Japan, and the global community will not have as much advance warning,
or at least not as clear a warning as was available during North
Korean’s preparations for its missile launch.
Since we cannot count on advance warning, at least not in a timeframe
sufficient for policy coordination, it is important that at a minimum
the U.S. and its allies consult now for the eventuality of a nuclear
test, even while working to avoid such a scenario. The U.S. and
Japan must move quickly and quietly to involve South Korea in such
planning. Not only does South Korea have a most direct interest,
but Seoul’s response will likely directly affect any Chinese
reaction. If Seoul does not respond firmly to a nuclear test, its
inaction will decrease the likelihood of a sufficiently robust
Chinese response. There is some indication that Seoul now recognizes
the failure of its diplomacy in the weeks following the July missile
test. Not only did Korea openly come out in opposition to the position
of the U.S. and Japan, but in declaring its support for a Chinese
position that even the Chinese eventually abandoned, Korea found
itself isolated and irrelevant in the international response. Hopefully,
the goodwill carried forward from the mid-September summit between
Bush and Roh, as well as the opportunities presented by a new leadership
in Japan, will allow a resumption of meaningful trilateral coordination.
The ultimate goal of the U.S., Japan, and South Korea should be
to ensure that the international response to a potential nuclear
test is multilateral in nature. Rather than simply waiting to see
what China might do, we should work to establish prior, agreed
upon responses in an international context rather then in bilateral
context Not only should this make it more likely that China will
respond, but may serve as deterrent to North Korea. The considerable
diplomatic work done in response to the July missile test lays
the groundwork for a potential post-nuclear test response. At a
minimum, UN Security Council Resolution 1695 forms a new benchmark
upon which future responses must inevitably build. Securing Chinese
and Russian support for that resolution was unprecedented, but
remains a trial run for the more important challenges that may
follow.
The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation
1401 New York Ave. NW Suite 740
Washington, DC 20005
Telephone: (202) 347-1994
Fax: (202) 347-3941 matwater@mansfieldfdn.org
