Trilateral Retreats: Toward New Regional Relations in Northeast
Asia
Proceedings Report
Retreat I
Korea-Japan Session
Maui, Hawaii
October 9-11, 2002
On October 9, 2002, The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation,
the Pacific Forum CSIS, and the Asia Foundation, launched a three-day
workshop retreat aimed at improving Japan’s relations with
South Korea—a relationship that is of vital importance to
U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Fourteen Japanese and
Korean intellectual leaders from a diverse range of fields gathered
in Maui, Hawaii, to examine the complexities of the bilateral relationship
and outline avenues for enhanced mutual trust and reconciliation.
The Maui retreat was the first of six planned meetings aimed at
improving Japan’s ties with South Korea and China.
Participants of the Maui retreat were selected for their potential
to have a broad “ripple effect” on improving mutual
understanding in their respective societies, as well as provide
a well-rounded representation of the bilateral relationship. The
seven Japanese and seven Korean participants included a uniquely
diverse group of broadcast and print journalists, scholars, policy
researchers, art historians, and civil society leaders. The retreat
also included a balanced representation of genders, with eight
of the 14 participants being women.
The retreat was divided into six sessions: 1) personal views of
the Japan-Korea relationship; 2) differing approaches to history;
3) identifying common interests and benefits of reconciliation;
4) identifying challenges in the Japan-Korea relationship; 5) de-politicizing
the relationship; 6) and conclusions and recommendations. Participants
were encouraged to speak openly on these subjects and to reflect
the overall perspectives of their societies, especially from the
vantage point of the participants’ respective fields. Representatives
of the four sponsoring U.S. organizations helped moderate and facilitate
each session.
Session I: Personal Views of the Japan-Korea Relationship
and Approaches to History
The first session, addressing views of the bilateral relationship,
was intended to gauge how much contact each participant has had
with counterparts from Korea and Japan and to evaluate how the
participants perceive bilateral ties.
Most of the participants had considerable experience with the
counterpart nation, although some participants admitted that their
contact was relatively limited. In general, the policy researchers
and scholars had the most experience in Korea-Japan issues, while
several of the media representatives had limited experience.
Nevertheless, participants from Japan and Korea drew a relatively
consistent picture of each other’s nations and the overall
nature of bilateral ties. The Japanese participants expressed an
acute awareness of the antagonism that most Koreans hold for Japan.
As one participant from Japan noted, many Japanese are aware of
the fact that Koreans do not like them.
The Korean participants stressed that historical problems continue
to cast a shadow over relations and that Japan has yet to reconcile
the past in a meaningful and comprehensive manner. This problem
is exemplified by the fact that some 30,000 Korean artifacts taken
by Japanese authorities during the war have yet to be returned,
as one Korean participant noted.
Still, participants from both nations acknowledged that cultural
and economic integration is increasing and that events such as
the jointly hosted 2002 World Cup have enhanced contact between
the two societies. One participant from Korea cautioned, however,
not to place too much stock in cultural integration. For instance,
Koreans may enjoy Japanese goods and pop-culture but that does
not necessarily mean that Koreans admire Japan as a nation. By
the same token, as one participant suggested, amicable ties between
Koreans and Japanese on the personal level should not be confused
with official relations, which remain standoffish at times.
Many participants pointed out that deep-rooted animosity and distrust
is vanishing due to the growing preponderance of younger generations
in both nations. In particular, Japanese participants said that
young Japanese are no longer raised with prejudicial perceptions
of Koreans—although one participant said that young people
can still be easily manipulated into hating Koreans.
A distinction was also made between old guard politicians and
younger politicians in Japan. Although young politicians espouse
a somewhat stronger sense of national identity, this is generally
not a form of nationalism that is directed against Koreans or other
regional neighbors. In fact, as one Japanese participant pointed
out, there seems renewed interest on the part of younger Diet members
to form legislative exchanges with Korean counterparts.
Younger politicians in Korea are also apparently adopting different
views of Japan. One participant said that the postwar generation
of leaders in Seoul no longer holds an inferiority complex toward
Japan and is striving for a more equal footing with Tokyo on regional
affairs.
The participants also addressed the role of the mass media in
shaping images of Korea and Japan. An expert from Korea noted that
media coverage of Japan is becoming more balanced and objective
in Korea. However, several Japanese participants expressed disappointment
in the way the Japanese media continues to cover Korea-related
news. One Japanese participant believes that the Japanese media
tends to whitewash prevailing negative sentiment toward Korea,
while another participant from Japan said that the broadcast media
has difficulty providing a moderate portrayal of Korea-Japan issues.
Participants also identified some of the more prominent problems
that continue to mar Korea-Japan ties, such as the history textbook
issue and the periodic visits to Yasukuni shrine by Japanese Prime
Minister Junichiro Koizumi. Several Korean participants pointed
out that Japanese politicians occasionally seem to go out of their
way to provoke Korea, such as when Diet members put a positive
light on Japan’s actions during the war.
In contrast to Germany, it was pointed out that Japan has maintained
an ambiguous interpretation of the war. One Korean participant
said, for instance, that many Japanese see the occupation of Korea
as benevolent and ultimately instrumental in modernizing the Peninsula.
The Japanese participants did not deny that such interpretations
of history exist, but one participant suggested that Japanese sometimes
unconsciously offend Koreans when they pay honor to figures that
are controversial outside of Japan (for instance, Yukichi Fukuzawa,
a Meiji-era intellectual leader and an outspoken proponent of colonizing
Korea, is printed on 10,000 yen bills).
The question was raised about whether such myriad differences
and historical disputes can ever be reconciled. One Korean participant
asked what exactly “resolving” the problem between
Korea and Japan means and wondered whether the historical dispute
is perhaps a “never ending story.” Another Japanese
participant asked whether there is a “single answer to the
interpretation of history” and concluded that perhaps both
sides will have to agree to disagree in order to improve relations.
Still, as one retreat facilitator suggested, reconciliation between
feuding nations is not impossible and that difficulties in the
Korea-Japan relationship should not be seen as a unique and insurmountable
challenge. A similar textbook problem, for instance, existed between
Germany and nations that were annexed by the Nazi regime during
the war, and was eventually worked out through a delicate reconciliation
process. The ultimate lesson is that wartime legacies are a universal
problem—one that can be solved by identifying and pursuing
common areas of agreement.
Session II: Identifying Common Interests and Benefits
of Reconciliation
The second day of the retreat began with the session on identifying
common interests and the benefits of reconciliation.
Looking from a geopolitical angle, one participant from Korea
suggested that the ascendancy of China as a dominant regional power
provides a greater incentive for South Korea and Japan to become
potential allies. In particular, neither nation is able to manage
China’s rise alone, and both can work together to hedge against
a potential Chinese threat while increasing opportunities to engage
China on the economic front. Similarly, both South Korea and Japan
should approach the development of Southeast and East Asian relations
(via international institutions such as ASEAN + 3) as a common
project.
Some Korean participants implied that their image of Japan has
evolved (i.e., the image is no longer simply that of an antagonist
or economic power) and has allowed for a clearer understanding
of mutual interests and the potential benefits of closer cooperation.
For instance, there seems to be greater parity between the two
nations on the North Korean threat and global humanitarian concerns,
the latter providing for enhanced bilateral NGO activities.
Still, as one Japanese participant observed, it is often easier
to find common ground on “negative” bilateral concerns
(such as threats from China and North Korea) but more complex to
find commonalities on “positive” regional and global
issues (such as combating global infectious diseases). Nevertheless,
bilateral civil society exchanges do exist and have gone a long
way toward increasing awareness of common interests. The same participant
said that, in fact, Korean civil society is more advanced than
Japan’s and that enhanced NGO cooperation will give Japanese
civil society an excellent opportunity to develop. (One impediment
to enhanced NGO cooperation is the lack of efficient Japanese institutions
supporting joint civil society activities.)
According to participants, Koreans and Japanese also share concerns
about the U.S. bases stationed in each country and, perhaps in
relation, the rise of anti-Americanism. However, one participant
said that criticism of the United States in Korea is no longer
purely “anti-Americanism,” but has become more issue
specific—focusing on the Status of Forces Agreement and environmental
problems associated with U.S. military installations).
Finally, a participant wondered whether it is really necessary
for both nations to cooperate and reach some level of reconciliation.
The same participant suggested that the basis of the relationship
centers on narrowly defined and shifting interests—Japan
needs South Korea to help maintain its status as a regional “hegemon” and
Korea needs Japan for its technological and financial prowess.
Yet, these interests may not be long lasting, thereby calling into
question the longevity of the bilateral relationship and the rationale
for its very existence.
Session III: Identifying Challenges in the Japan-Korea
Relationship
In the next session on identifying challenges in the relationship,
the group went through an exercise of listing perceived problems
that each country has vis-à-vis the other. The following
list of points includes what the group considered to be the most
important issues listed first:
Problems with Japan
Historical amnesia
Rightwing rhetoric
Apathy toward South Korea
Textbooks
Yakukuni Shrine visits
Comfort women
Return of cultural properties
Discrimination against ethnic Koreans
Absence of national consensus
Tokdo Island dispute
East Sea issue
Fisheries
Homogeneity
Small country complex
Insularity
Free Trade Agreement
Rivalry
Opposition to Korean unification
No Korea specialist w/ influence in Tokyo
Views on China
Apathy of youth
Problems with Korea
Personal vs. Public (anti-Jpns as social norm)
Obsession with history
Lack of diversity
Institutions as part of problem
Emotionalism
Hesitancy to cooperate
Hyper patriotism
Textbooks (ideology)
Territorial issues (Takeshima; Sea of Japan)
FTA
Fisheries
Cultural superiority complex
Small country complex
IPR (?)
Rivalry
Cultural protectionism
Overlooking historical roots of imperial family
North Korea
Paranoia about Japanese motives to DPRK
Differing views on China
Sexual morality
Session IV: De-politicizing the Relationship
The penultimate session addressed ways of overcoming domestic
political constraints. One of the main suggestions, echoed by participants
from both nations throughout the retreat, was the need to approach
historical differences within a broader framework than simply a
bilateral context. For instance, the strategic implications of
the history problem should be taken into greater consideration.
Korean participants expressed frustration with rightwing rhetoric
in Japan and numerous insensitive remarks made by Japanese Diet
members, which have the appearance of being official statements.
Another source of frustration is the perception that Japanese are
quick to make rhetorical apologies for past actions, but are often
negligent in following up their words with concrete actions.
Many Japanese participants responded to these observations by
pointing out that the rightwing represents only a fringe element
of the Japanese public and that Diet members are routinely forced
to resign for making insensitive comments. One participant said
that Koreans should not see the words of a few rightists as representative
of the entire nation.
In addition, Japanese participants stressed, Japan does not have
a public consensus on issues like history and that, as a democracy,
Japan cannot control rightwing rhetoric. Nevertheless, Japanese
participants sought to reassure the group that their nation is
heading in a positive direction vis-à-vis Korea and that
this trend will stand the best chance of continuing if there is
no outside pressure from Koreans.
One participant suggested that both nations should continue to
marginalize rightwing extremists and to educate the public and
leaders in order to avoid future differences over historical issues.
Prominent intellectuals would play a vital role in this effort.
Session V: Conclusions and Recommendations
In the concluding session, the group was asked to provide forward-looking
thoughts on bilateral relations and to suggest future projects
that would help nurture reconciliation. Participants were also
asked to give key recommendations, directed either at their own
nations or to their counterpart nations, in order to improve relations.
The participants made the following recommendations and points:
· Japan should restore its economy and play a leading role
in establish a yen-based Asian financial system
· Korea and Japan should create an FTA to promote trade and take advantage
of mutual economic interests
· South Korea should continue the Sunshine policy toward North Korea
· Korea and Japan should maintain good relations with the United States
· Establish an international institution of scholars to oversee the drafting
of an objective and accurate historical textbook
· South Korea should create a Japanese teachers’ exchange program,
modeled after the JET program
· Japanese Prime Ministers should not visit Yasukuni Shrine in an official
capacity
· Japan should promote more cultural exchanges and large-scale exhibitions
of Korean and Japanese art
· Create a KOICA/JAICA intern exchange program
· A program should be started to arrange organized trips to Japan by Korean
high school principals
· Develop a joint technical cooperation program to aid developing nations
· Japanese should avoid offending Korean feelings and South Korean journalists
should write more positive reports about Japan
· Improve daily interaction between both nations’ national TV networks
and establish an exchange of editorial-level journalists
· Tourism ministries in both nations should provide discount travel packages
to Korea and Japan in order to foster better understanding at the grassroots
level
· South Korean presidents should not try to do too much to solve historical
issues, history will be dealt with over time
· There should be two strategies for the history issue: containment (confine
debate within scholarly circles) and engagement (form an international committee
to examine Asian history and resolve historical differences)
· Develop a transnational coalition to isolate rightwing voices in both
countries
· Launch a joint UN Peace Keeping Operation, such as in East Timor
When asked whether a visit by the Japanese emperor to South Korea
would be beneficial to bilateral relations, only one participant
said such a visit would not be helpful. However, most of the participants
believed that an imperial visit to Korea would not be likely for
another five to ten years.
Finally, one of the session moderators asked the group whether
a joint U.S.-South Korea-Japan naval operation could conceivably
be launched sometime soon. The consensus response was no. In fact,
reminded the moderator, such an operation occurred in 1983 when
all three navies coordinated under tense conditions to salvage
KAL 007, which was shot down by a Soviet fighter—proof of
the saliency of trilateral cooperation and the need to forge ties
in the face of myriad challenges.
List of Retreat Participants:
Korean Participants
HAN Seungmi
Assistant Professor of Japanese Studies, Yonsei University Graduate School
of International Studies
KIM Sangwoo
Ambassador for International & Strategic Affairs
KIM Sun-duck
Editorial Writer, Donga Ilbo
KWON Cheeyun
Art Historian
PARK Cheol Hee
Assistant Professor, Department for Asia Pacific Studies, Institute of Foreign
Affairs & National Security
PARK Doosik
Editorial Writer, The Chosun Ilbo
YOON Jungsook
Executive Director, Womenlink
Japanese Participants
DODEN Aiko
NHK anchor/correspondent
HAYASHI Yoko
Art historian/Art event manager
HONDA Masahiro
Associate Professor, Musashino Woman’s University
IKEGAMI Kiyoko
Director for Japan of UNFPA on loan from Japanese population NGO JOICFP
KONDO Motohiro
Professor, School of Graduate Studies, Nihon University
SAKAMOTO Takashi
News Editor, T.V. News Division, Digital Media Bureau,Yomiuri Shimbun
TANAKA-SHICHINOHE Yoshiko
Institute for Global Social Studies and Economics
Organizers
Ralph Cossa
President, Pacific Forum, CSIS
Gordon Flake
Executive Director, The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation
Brad Glosserman
Director of Research, Pacific Forum, CSIS
Andrew Horvat
Tokyo Representative, The Asia Foundation
Weston Konishi
Senior Research and Program Officer, The Mansfield Foundation
Scott Snyder
Seoul Representative, The Asia Foundation
