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DialoguesResearch and Education |
“Japan’s Snap Elections: Implications for Tokyo and Washington”
Speakers:
Mr. Watanabe provided an overview of the current status of Japanese politics, and discussed six important factors of the elections, which are set for September 11.
First, according to Mr. Watanabe, Prime Minister Koizumi still enjoys a relatively high approval rate for an incumbent prime minister. According to the most recent Asahi Shimbun opinion poll, 46% of Japanese voters approve of Prime Minister Koizumi (the average approval rate for incumbent prime ministers in Japan is approximately 30%, said Mr. Watanabe).
Second, Prime Minister Koizumi’s postal system reform, which he claims is the most important agenda for this election, is popular among the public, as well. The same Asahi poll shows that 53% of Japanese voters support privatizing the postal service while 27% oppose the reforms. Mr. Watanabe suggested that the postal privatization measures are really an effort by Koizumi to forge a smaller government and argued that the idea of small government is becoming popular among Japanese voters.
Third, whether or not Prime Minister Koizumi will visit the Yasukuni shrine is an important factor for the election. The prime ministers’ visits to the controversial shrine are not popular, as the left-leaning Asahi polls show that 47% are against the visits while 41% support the visits. Mr. Watanabe predicted that Prime Minister Koizumi would not visit the shrine before the election, as his visit would aggravate the Liberal Democratic Party’s coalition partner Komeito, which played a key role in previous election campaigns. (As it turns out, Koizumi did not visit the shrine on August 15, as he had once promised to do.)
Fourth, the LDP still enjoys a higher support rating than the Democratic Party of Japan, the largest opposition party. The Asahi poll shows that 38% of voters support the LDP while the DPJ’s support rate is only 28%.
Fifth, due to the relatively short period of time for preparation for the election, Komeito will not be able to mobilize its voting base effectively. (This means that even if Komeito wanted to end its alliance with the LDP and form a coalition with the DPJ, it would not be able to do so.)
Finally, the DPJ is still more popular among voters with no party affiliation than the LDP. The Asahi poll shows that 40% of these independent voters (representing 33% of the entire voter population) support the DPJ while only 17% of independents support the LDP.
Mr. Watanabe argued that if neither the LDP-Komeito coalition nor the DPJ gains the majority, the LDP will make a compromise with so-called rebels who voted against the postal privatization bill. If that is the case, Mr. Watanabe predicted that the next prime minister will be someone more dovish than Koizumi, such as Mr. Yasuo Fukuda, Mr. Taro Aso or Mr. Sadakazu Tanigaki. However, according to Mr. Watanabe’s colleagues in Tokyo, the LDP-Komeito coalition will most likely gain the majority. For this scenario to be the case, Mr. Watanabe argued that Mr. Isao Iijima, Prime Minister Koizumi’s secretary, often seen as Japan’s Karl Rove, would be a key person, as he is adept at using the media to change public opinion. Whether or not Komeito can quickly mobilize its voting base will also be a key factor.
Ms. Tatsumi discussed the implications that this election would have on the U.S.-Japan security alliance. Ms. Tatsumi argued that regardless of who wins, the results of the election will have a minimal impact on the U.S.-Japan alliance in the long run. However, the election results will have implications for the alliance in the immediate future.
Ms. Tatsumi suggested that the elections will fundamentally alter the decision-making process of the LDP. In the past, decision-making largely occurred in backroom deals made among various LDP factions. The upcoming elections, however, will largely eradicate the factions, thereby forcing decision-making in the Diet to become more public and transparent. While this will be a positive improvement on the Japanese political system, it will likely make decision-making in the Diet more cumbersome and potentially contentious. This could hamper efforts to implement a range of U.S.-Japan alliance initiatives, from the Pentagon’s plans to realign bases in Japan to bilateral missile defense development.
In particular, Ms. Tatsumi gave several specific examples of how the current political turmoil in Tokyo could affect U.S.-Japan alliance cooperation. First, she argued that the negotiations on U.S. force realignment have already been delayed, and the current political turmoil could further delay the process. Second, she said that the Diet must also pass another bill to extend the Self-Defense Forces’ dispatch to Iraq before the current law expires in December. Finally, when the six-party talks over the North Korean nuclear crisis resume at the end of August, Japanese negotiators may only have political support from lame ducks in the Cabinet, who may not have the political clout to deliver a deal with North Korea.
Ms. Tatsumi concluded that Washington should in general welcome the upcoming changes in Tokyo but that the short-term implications could impede recent developments in the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship.
A Q&A session followed the presentation. 
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